“Why Nigeria’s regulators must work together when power, communications and essential services depend on one another”
At a market in Minna, a customer pays for a bag of rice by transfer. His phone says the money has left his account. The trader’s phone says nothing. He shows her the screenshot. She thanks him politely and keeps one hand on the rice. She has been in business long enough to know that a screenshot is a poor substitute for money she can spend.
Both may be telling the truth. The customer’s account may have been debited while the trader’s bank is still waiting to receive or confirm the payment. For the customer, the problem is the possibility of paying twice. For the trader, it is the possibility of giving away her stock. And somewhere between their two phones are banks, a payment network, telecoms links and computers that need steady power. The people running those systems may each see a small part of the delay. The two people standing over the rice have to live with the whole of it.
Take that scene to a hospital. A doctor needs a patient’s records and the screen will not load. The hospital may have electricity of its own, yet the records may sit in a data centre elsewhere, or the connection to them may have failed. Now go to the control room of the national grid. Engineers trying to restore electricity need communications to see where the trouble is and coordinate repairs. The phone network needs power, and the power system needs the phone and data networks. We are accustomed to treating electricity as something that comes out of a socket and digital services as something that comes out of a phone. In practice, each increasingly helps keep the other working.
Nigeria saw how far a failure can travel in March 2024, when damage to several undersea cables disrupted internet and telecommunications services here and elsewhere along the West African coast. It is easy for a business to assume that two internet contracts give it two ways to reach the world. Both connections may travel along the same route. A similar problem arises if two backup facilities depend on the same local power network. On a good day, these arrangements can look perfectly sound. On a bad day, the distinction between two suppliers and two independent routes becomes very real.
The effort to bring more digital services home makes these questions more pressing. Nigeria’s National Digital Cloud Policy seeks to attract investment in local hosting and position the country to serve customers across the region. The Central Bank says its rules on keeping regulated payment transaction data in Nigeria take full effect on 1 January 2027 and cover backup and recovery sites. It is reasonable to expect more demand for local facilities and people trained to operate them. There is a business opportunity here. There is also a public question. If several banks move into the same few facilities, we may bring the data closer to home while making more of our economy depend on fewer places.
Estonia faced a version of that problem and made an interesting choice. It arranged to keep backups of essential government systems in Luxembourg under an agreement that preserves Estonian control. The lesson is about what survives a crisis. For Nigerian payment data covered by the Central Bank’s rules, the corresponding approach would be to use genuinely separate locations within Nigeria. For other categories of information, the right arrangement will depend on the law, the sensitivity of the records and the ability of the responsible institution to recover them. A government agency should be able to answer a plain question before signing any hosting contract. If this company closes tomorrow, can we get our records back and carry on serving the public?
There is another side to the story, and it begins at the electricity substation. A data centre is essentially a building full of computers that must be kept running and cool. For an investor, dependable power is part of what makes the business viable. For a nearby household or factory, the arrival of a large customer raises a different question. Will the investment bring more dependable electricity into the area, or will it draw on a network that is already struggling? Both outcomes are possible. The difference lies in where the centre is built, what supply it can bring with it and who pays to expand the network.
Ireland had to confront that question after data centres went from 5 per cent of its electricity demand in 2015 to 22 per cent in 2024. Its regulator now takes local network constraints into account and requires new centres connecting to the grid to provide nearby or on-site generation or storage. China approached the location question on a different scale, moving some computing work towards western regions with more room and energy resources. The two experiences point to a practical distinction for Nigeria. A service that confirms a payment in seconds needs a fast and dependable connection. A secure backup can be farther away and may be safer for it. A state with reliable power, independent fibre routes and skilled workers could make a good home for the second service even if most of its customers live elsewhere.
That is one plausible direction for Nigeria over the next three to five years. If Project BRIDGE delivers much of its planned 90,000 kilometres of fibre and more states can offer dependable power, hosting and recovery facilities could spread to several parts of the country. If fibre expands while reliable electricity remains concentrated, investment is likely to follow the same few locations. In the longer run, Nigeria could serve more of the West African market if it can offer predictable power costs and dependable connections across borders. Artificial intelligence may add to demand, but an announcement about a proposed facility can travel considerably faster than the electricity needed to run it. Grid planners will need to know which projects have firm commitments and how much power they will require.
By this point the question of regulation looks rather different. A company can keep millions of records and still be able to tolerate a short interruption. A much smaller operator may carry the emergency calls for an entire area. What makes a service essential is the harm its failure would cause, how soon that harm would begin and whether people have a workable alternative. Singapore’s financial regulator starts with the service people rely on, asks how quickly it must be restored and works back through the institutions and suppliers needed to restore it. Apply that test to a Nigerian hospital and recovery means a doctor can retrieve the record. Apply it to the market and it means the trader can confirm the payment. Each supplier may have met its own target while the person at the end of the chain is still waiting.
Nigeria already has pieces of a regulatory answer. The 2024 Order on Critical National Information Infrastructure covers designated systems in electricity, telecommunications, banking, health and other sectors. It gives the Office of the National Security Adviser a role in developing protection standards and arranging trusted information sharing. The Electricity Act gives states a role in their own electricity markets while leaving national grid and interstate matters with the federal regulator. The Data Protection Act sets duties for protecting personal information and reporting certain breaches. What still needs to be worked out is how the authorities act together when an ordinary power or equipment fault spills across several of those mandates.
I would therefore propose a national code for keeping essential services running, backed by a federal–state agreement. The power and digital economy ministries could convene the work, with the Office of the National Security Adviser carrying out its role under the existing Order. Each regulator would give effect to agreed duties through its own lawful powers. The code should make clear who receives the first report, who leads for each affected service, who brings the authorities together when the incident spreads and who keeps the public informed. A common reporting channel could get the same basic facts to all the right authorities while preserving their legal deadlines. If the work reveals that regulators lack a specific power they need, that is a case to take to the National Assembly.
The same approach helps answer the question of government seats on company boards. A seat may be justified where the state has an ownership interest or a defined public responsibility. But consider a cloud company used by several banks. What the authorities need to see is whether it can restore those banks at the same time and whether the banks can move their operations if it fails. That calls for enforceable duties, access for independent checks and a view across the market. The duty to keep the service running should follow the company providing it, whoever sits in its boardroom.
Within six months, the government could publish a draft code and agree with states and regulators on a first set of services to examine. Within a year, it could run a joint exercise involving payments, emergency communications and selected hospital records. Give the participants a plausible problem. A data centre loses power and its usual communications link fails. Let us see what still works, who takes charge and what citizens are told. Give each shortcoming an owner and a deadline, and publish how long essential services take to recover. The people designing digital services should also provide a fallback for the citizen with no smartphone, no signal or an urgent need that cannot wait until the system comes back.
Back in Minna, the trader would probably forgive us for taking an interest in the future of cloud computing. She would be more impressed if her bank could tell her, promptly and plainly, whether she has been paid and what to do if she hasn’t. The doctor in the hospital is entitled to the same clarity, with considerably more at stake. Their experience is where this national conversation ought to begin. It is also how we will know whether it has made a difference.
Ndanusa, PhD, OON, is an economist, lawyer, strategic studies scholar, and public policy thinker and practitioner with extensive experience in financial markets, regulation, governance, national Security and development.
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